Representation Theory of the Symmetric Group in Voting Theory and Game
  Theory by Crisman, Karl-Dieter & Orrison, Michael E.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
8.
05
89
1v
1 
 [m
ath
.R
T]
  2
4 A
ug
 20
15
REPRESENTATION THEORY OF THE SYMMETRIC GROUP
IN VOTING THEORY AND GAME THEORY
KARL-DIETER CRISMAN AND MICHAEL E. ORRISON
Abstract. This paper is a survey of some of the ways in which the repre-
sentation theory of the symmetric group has been used in voting theory and
game theory. In particular, we use permutation representations that arise
from the action of the symmetric group on tabloids to describe, for example,
a surprising relationship between the Borda count and Kemeny rule in vot-
ing. We also explain a powerful representation-theoretic approach to working
with linear symmetric solution concepts in cooperative game theory. Along
the way, we discuss new research questions that arise within and because of
the representation-theoretic framework we are using.
1. Introduction
Symmetry arises in many ways in voting theory and game theory. In this paper,
we highlight one such appearance by surveying some of the ways in which the
representation theory of the symmetric group has been used in these fields. Our
primary goal is to show how certain well-understood permutation representations
of the symmetric group can be used to make sense of foundational ideas in voting
theory and game theory, and how using these representations can in turn help
researchers formulate novel questions and meaningful generalizations.
Among other examples, we use the representation theory of the symmetric group
to describe a surprising relationship between the Borda count and the Kemeny rule
in voting. We also use it to construct and make sense of certain infinite families
of solution concepts in cooperative game theory. Along the way, we describe much
of the representation-theoretic framework used in voting theory and game theory,
and we discuss several new research questions that arise therein.
The permutation representations on which we focus are those associated to the usual
action of the symmetric group Sn on simple combinatorial objects called tabloids.
Representation theory experts will have no trouble seeing that we only scratch the
surface on what could be done with these representations in voting theory and game
theory. Another goal for this paper is therefore to encourage readers to contribute
to these fields by going well beyond what we present here.
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As a brief introduction to the role that symmetry can play in voting, consider a
situation in which voters are asked to choose their favorite candidate A, B, or C.
If we end with a profile of (13, 4, 7) for A,B,C respectively, then it is natural to
say this is essentially the same profile as (9, 0, 3), because there are four votes for
each candidate that “cancel” each other. We can go further, though, by writing
(13, 4, 7) = (8, 8, 8) + (5,−4,−1) and noting that the first vector on the right cap-
tures how many voters there were, while the second vector captures the different
levels of support the candidates received, which in the end is what really matters.
Interestingly, such decompositions profiles arise by having the symmetric group S3
act on the candidates by permuting their labels, which in turn induces an action on
the set of profiles. Furthermore, by having the symmetric group act on the labels
of candidates in much more complicated voting situations, similar decompositions
of profiles arise, and we are able to use what we know about the resulting subspaces
of voting data to say something worthwhile (as we will demonstrate in Section 3)
about how profiles are used by different kinds of voting procedures.
In the next section, we introduce most of the notation we will use for the rest of the
paper, and we motivate the use of tabloids for indexing the kind of data with which
we will be working. Although we do not assume our readers will be familiar with
the ideas we will be presenting from voting theory and game theory, we will assume
that our readers have a basic working knowledge of the representation theory of
finite groups (see, for example, [13, 38]).
Finally, we encourage interested readers to view the ideas presented in this paper
within the larger framework of harmonic analysis on finite groups [2, 3, 7, 42]. In
our opinion, doing so makes it much easier to see how the representation theory of
the symmetric group (and other finite groups) has been applied outside of voting
theory and game theory, in fields, for example, such as statistics [1, 7, 8, 25] and
machine learning [11, 23, 24]. Doing so will also reveal that the approach we are
taking in this paper has already found success in a variety of other settings.
2. Background
In this section, we define tabloids and their associated permutation representations
of the symmetric group. We also describe how tabloids can be used to index the kind
of voting and game-theoretic data with which we will be working. Good references
for the material in this section are [12] and [36].
Let n be a positive integer. A composition of n is a list λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) of positive
integers whose sum is n. If it is also the case that λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λm, then we say
λ is a partition of n. For example, (2, 3, 1, 3) is a composition of 9, and (4, 2, 2, 1)
is a partition of 9. If λ is a composition, then we will denote by λ the partition
obtained by reordering the numbers in λ so that they form a non-increasing list.
For example, if λ = (2, 3, 1, 3), then λ = (3, 3, 2, 1).
If λ is a composition of n, then the Young diagram of shape λ is the left-justified
array of boxes that has λi boxes in its ith row (see Figure 1). If we fill these boxes
REPRESENTATION THEORY, VOTING THEORY, AND GAME THEORY 3
with the numbers 1, . . . , n without repetition, then we create a Young tableau of
shape λ. Two tableaux of shape λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) are then said to be row equivalent
if they have the same set of λ1 numbers in the first row, the same set of λ2 numbers
in the second row, and so on. An equivalence class of tableaux is then called a
tabloid of shape λ.
Figure 1. The Young diagram of shape (2, 3, 1, 3).
We often denote a tabloid by first forming a representative tableau and then re-
moving the vertical dividers within each row (see Figure 2). For convenience, we
will usually choose the representative tableau whose entries in each row are in as-
cending order, and we will read the entries from top to bottom when putting such
representatives and their associated tabloids in lexicographic order.
2 6
3 5 1
8
9 7 4
6 2
5 3 1
8
4 9 7
2 6
1 3 5
8
4 7 9
Figure 2. Two row equivalent tableaux and their tabloid.
Suppose λ is a composition of n. Let Xλ denote the set of tabloids of shape λ,
and let Mλ denote the vector space of real-valued functions defined on Xλ. If
x ∈ Xλ, then fx will denote its associated indicator function with the property that
fx(x) = 1 and fx(y) = 0 for all y 6= x. Note that the set of such indicator functions
forms an orthonormal basis forMλ with the respect to the usual inner product 〈·, ·〉
on Mλ, which is defined by setting
〈f ,g〉 =
∑
x∈Xλ
f(x)g(x)
for all f ,g ∈ Mλ. We will call this basis of indicator functions the usual basis of
Mλ, and when necessary we will assume it has been ordered with respect to the
lexicographic ordering of the associated tabloids in Xλ.
In this paper, we will be interested in a variety of real-valued functions defined on
Xλ for different choices of λ. We will also be interested in certain linear transfor-
mations defined on Mλ.
For example, consider an election involving n candidates labeled 1 through n. If
we ask the voters to tell us their top favorite λ1 candidates, then their next top
favorite λ2 candidates, and so on, then we can interpret each of their responses as
a tabloid x ∈ Xλ. For example, if λ = (2, 3, 1, 3), and a voter chooses the tabloid in
Figure 2, then we will take that to mean candidates 2 and 6 are her top two favorite
candidates, but we do not know if the voter prefers one of these two candidates over
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the other. The function f ∈ Mλ in which we are then interested is simply the one
for which f(x) is the total number of voters who chose tabloid x ∈ Xλ.
We will mostly focus on three kinds of compositions in this paper. The first com-
position is the all-ones partition (1, . . . , 1). The tabloids in X(1,...,1) naturally cor-
respond to all of the possible permutations of the numbers 1, . . . , n. Therefore,
M (1,...,1) is helpful when describing voting situations in which voters are asked to
provide a full ranking of candidates. The second kind of composition has the form
(k, n− k) where 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. In this case, we will use the tabloids in X(k,n−k) to
index k-element subsets of {1, . . . , n}, where each k-element subset corresponds to
the tabloid whose top row contains all of its elements. Finally, the third composi-
tion is (n). The set X(n) consists of a single, one-rowed tabloid which we will use
to index the entire set {1, . . . , n}.
As an example of how we will use M (1,...,1) and M (k,n−k) in this paper, in the next
section we will consider the voting situation in which voters have been asked to fully
rank a set of n candidates. We will then use that information, which we will view
as an element of M (1,...,1), to assign points to each of the individual candidates.
The result may therefore be viewed as an element of M (1,n−1). Furthermore, we
will do all of this using a linear transformation from M (1,...,1) to M (1,n−1).
Now it is natural in voting to insist that a voting method not depend on how we
label the candidates. Fortunately, we may easily express this property using a group
action. More specifically, note that the symmetric group Sn acts naturally on X
λ
where if σ ∈ Sn and x ∈ Xλ, then σ · x is the tabloid one gets by applying the
permutation σ to each entry of x.
The action of Sn on X
λ extends to an action of Sn onM
λ where if σ ∈ Sn, f ∈Mλ,
and x ∈ Xλ, then
(σ · f)(x) = f(σ−1 · x).
In other words, Mλ may be viewed as a module over the group algebra RSn. For
example,M (n) corresponds to the trivial RSn-module. This is becauseX
(n) consists
of a single tabloid, and every permutation in Sn fixes this tabloid.
In the voting example above, we can view the action of Sn onM
(1,...,1) andM (1,n−1)
as the result of changing the labels on the candidates. When the outcome of a voting
method does not depend on the labels that have been assigned to the candidates,
we say that the voting method is neutral (see, for example, [29, 41], among many
other references for general voting theory concepts). Insisting that a voting method
based on a linear transformation T : M (1,...,1) → M (1,n−1) be neutral then simply
becomes the requirement that T must be an RSn-module homomorphism. We will
focus only on voting methods that are neutral in this paper.
Fortunately, the representation theory of Mλ is well-understood. The irreducible
RSn-modules are parametrized by the partitions of n, and we denote the irreducible
module corresponding to the partition µ by Sµ. These are the well-known Specht
modules where, for example, S(n) corresponds to the one-dimensional trivial RSn-
module.
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If λ is a partition of n (and not just a composition), then Mλ is isomorphic to a
direct sum of Specht modules
Mλ ∼=
⊕
µ
κµλS
µ
where the κµλ are Kostka numbers and are used here record the multiplicity of each
Specht module in Mλ (see, for example, Sections 2.3 and 2.11 of [36]).
Note that if λ is a composition of n and not necessarily a partition, then the
module Mλ is easily seen to be isomorphic to Mλ by simply reordering the rows of
the tabloids in Xλ. We may therefore just as easily work with compositions as with
partitions of n when dealing with real-valued functions (e.g., voting data) defined
on sets (e.g., rankings of candidates) that are indexed by tabloids.
The modules M (1,...,1), M (k,n−k), and M (n) have particularly straightforward de-
compositions in terms of Specht modules. For example, M (1,...,1) is isomorphic to
the regular RSn-module, and thus
M (1,...,1) ∼=
⊕
µ
(dimSµ)Sµ.
If 1 ≤ k ≤ n/2 (so that (n− k, k) is a partition of n), then
M (k,n−k) ∼=M (n−k,k) ∼= S(n) ⊕ S(n−1,1) ⊕ S(n−2,2) ⊕ · · · ⊕ S(n−k,k).
Lastly, because M (n) corresponds to the trivial RSn-module, we have that M
(n) ∼=
S(n) (see Chapter 7 of [7] or Section 2.11 of [36]).
Before leaving this section, we introduce some specialized notation and terminology
that we will use later in the paper.
First, note that M (1,n−1) is a direct sum of two irreducible submodules. These
submodules are easy to describe (see also p. 39 in [36]). One of the submodules,
which we will denote by U0, is isomorphic to S
(n) and consists of all of the constant
functions in M (1,n−1):
U0 =
{
f ∈M (1,n−1) | f(x) = f(y) for all x, y ∈ X(1,n−1)
}
.
The other submodule, which we will denote by U1, is isomorphic to S
(n−1,1). It is
the orthogonal complement of U0, and it consists of those functions whose values
sum to zero:
U1 =

 f ∈M (1,n−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈X(1,n−1)
f(x) = 0

 .
If f ∈M (1,n−1), then we will denote its projection into U1 by f̂ . Thus f = (f− f̂)+ f̂
where f − f̂ ∈ U0 and f̂ ∈ U1. In fact, if we let 1 ∈ M (1,n−1) denote the function
that assigns the value 1 to every tabloid, and let 1f denote the projection of f onto
1, then f − f̂ = 1f .
Next, note that the action of Sn on X
λ is transitive. In other words, given two
tabloids x, y ∈ Xλ, there exists at least one permutation σ ∈ Sn such that σ ·x = y.
In this case, we have that σ · fx = fy. It follows that every module homomorphism
6 KARL-DIETER CRISMAN AND MICHAEL E. ORRISON
defined on Mλ is determined by the image of any of the indicator functions fx. For
convenience, when we construct such maps, we will focus on the image of fx0 , where
we use x0 to denote the tabloid in X
λ that appears first when the tabloids in Xλ
are listed lexicographically. More specifically, x0 ∈ Xλ is the tabloid that contains
the tableau whose entries, when read from left to right and top to bottom, are the
numbers 1, . . . , n in that order.
Finally, suppose λ is a composition of n, and that T is a module homomorphism
defined on Mλ. The module Mλ can be written as the direct sum
Mλ = kerT ⊕ (kerT )⊥
of the kernel of T and its orthogonal complement. We will refer to the submodule
(kerT )⊥ as the effective space of T , and we will denote it by E(T ). Note that the
effective space E(T ) is isomorphic to (and also determines) the image of T .
3. Voting Theory
For algebraists interested in learning about the mathematics of voting, Donald
Saari’s papers [27, 30–32] and books [28, 29, 33, 34] are a fruitful place to start. His
work provides a friendly but mathematically sophisticated gateway to the subject,
and although his approach is primarily geometric, linear algebra and symmetry are
used to great effect.
Some of Saari’s key results rely on decomposing vector spaces of voting data into a
handful of simple but meaningful subspaces. Despite the geometric flavor of many of
his papers, algebraists will easily recognize many of these subspaces as submodules
of M (1,...,1). This realization has been put to use in papers such as [5] and [6], and
what follows in this section can be partly viewed as an introduction to those two
papers.
We begin by considering an election in which there are n candidates labeled 1, . . . , n.
Suppose each voter has been asked to rank the candidates by choosing a tabloid
in X(1,...,1), where the candidate in the top row of the tabloid is their favorite, the
candidate in the second row is their second favorite, and so on.
For example, if there are n = 3 candidates, then each voter is being asked to choose
one of the following tabloids from X(1,1,1):
1
2
3
,
1
3
2
,
2
1
3
,
2
3
1
,
3
1
2
,
3
2
1
.
In this case, a voter who chooses the third tabloid above is saying that she prefers
candidate 2 to candidate 1 to candidate 3.
Let p ∈ M (1,...,1) be the function with the property that p(x) is the number of
voters who chose the tabloid x. The function p is called a profile. Next, let
w = [w1, . . . , wn]
t be a column vector in Rn such that w1 ≥ · · · ≥ wn. The
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vector w is called a weighting vector, and we will use this vector of “weights” to
create a voting procedure as follows.
For each tabloid x ∈ X(1,...,1), if candidate i is in row j of x, then she will be
given p(x)wj points. We then sum over all of the tabloids in X
(1,...,1) to find the
total number of points received by candidate i. The candidates who receive the
most points (there might be ties) are then declared to be winners. We refer to this
voting procedure as the positional voting procedure associated to w. Note that the
inequality condition above ensures that a voter’s “more favored” candidates receive
at least as many points from her as her “less favored” candidates.
Note that w = [1, 0, . . . , 0]t corresponds to the plurality voting procedure, where
voters are essentially being asked to vote for only one candidate. When w =
[1, . . . , 1, 0]t, we get the anti-plurality voting procedure, where voters are essentially
being asked to vote against their least favorite candidate. The Borda count, where
a candidate receives (i − 1) points for each time she is ranked in the ith position
by a voter, is given by the vector w = [n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 2, 1, 0]t.
Let w(i) ∈ M (1,...,1) be defined by setting w(i)(x) = wj if candidate i is contained
in the jth row of the tabloid x. We can use the function w(i) to find the total
number of points candidate i will receive, which is∑
x∈X(1,...,1)
p(x)w(i)(x) = 〈p,w(i)〉.
Furthermore, we can use the tabloids in X(1,n−1) to index the candidates by associ-
ating y ∈ X(1,n−1) with the single candidate in the top row of y. With that in mind,
let ci ∈M (1,n−1) denote the indicator function of the tabloid corresponding to can-
didate i. We can then create the module homomorphism Tw :M
(1,...,1) →M (1,n−1)
by setting
Tw(f) = 〈f ,w
(1)〉c1 + · · ·+ 〈f ,w
(n)〉cn.
The coefficient in front of ci in Tw(p) is therefore simply the number of points that
candidate i received when we apply the positional voting procedure associated with
w to the profile p.
To see the motivation behind the notation defined above, consider encoding the
calculation of Tw(p) as a matrix-vector multiplication. For example, let n = 3, and
suppose w = [1, s, 0]t for some s such that 1 ≥ s ≥ 0. If the coordinate vector of
p with respect to the usual basis of M (1,1,1) is [3, 2, 0, 2, 0, 4]t, then the coordinate
vector of Tw(p) with respect to the usual basis of M
(1,2) is given by

1 1 s 0 s 0s 0 1 1 0 s
0 s 0 s 1 1




3
2
4
2
0
3


=

5 + 4s6 + 6s
3 + 4s

 .
In this case, the functions w(1),w(2),w(3) correspond to the three rows of the 3-by-
6 matrix, and we are simply dotting each of these rows with the coordinate vector
8 KARL-DIETER CRISMAN AND MICHAEL E. ORRISON
of p to find the coordinate vector [5 + 4s, 6+ 6s, 3+ 4s]t of points received by each
of the candidates. (Note that Tw(p) = (5 + 4s)c1 + (6 + 6s)c2 + (3 + 4s)c3.)
There is, however, more to see here. Notice that each column of the 3-by-6 matrix
can be obtained by permuting the entries of the weighting vector w = [1, s, 0]t. In
fact, if x0 ∈ X(1,1,1) is the tabloid with candidate i in row i, and σ ∈ Sn, then
the column of the matrix corresponding to the tabloid σ · x0 corresponds to the
function (1)cσ(1) + (s)cσ(2) + (0)cσ(3) in M
(1,2).
From this point on we will slightly abuse our notation by identifying the weighting
vector w with the function w1c1 + · · ·+ wncn ∈ M (1,n−1). If x0 ∈ X(1,...,1) is the
tabloid with candidate i in row i, and f˜ ∈ RSn is defined by setting f˜ (σ) = f(σ ·x0),
we then have that
Tw(f) =
∑
σ∈Sn
f(σ · x0)(w1cσ(1) + · · ·+ wncσ(n))
=
∑
σ∈Sn
f˜(σ)(σ ·w)
= f˜ ·w.
In other words, we may interpret the function Tw(f) as the result of the group
algebra element f˜ ∈ RSn acting on the function w ∈ M (1,n−1). Finding functions
f ∈M (1,...,1) so that Tw(f) has certain desirable properties then becomes a question
of finding appropriate elements of the group algebra RSn to act on w ∈M (1,n−1).
This was one of the key insights in [6], and it leads to theorems like the following,
which is essentially a special case of Theorem 1 in that paper:
Theorem 1. Let n ≥ 2, and suppose w1, . . . ,wk ∈ U1 ⊂M (1,n−1) form a linearly
independent set of weighting vectors. If r1, . . . , rk ∈ U1, then there exist infinitely
many functions f ∈M (1,...,1) such that Twi(f) = ri for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
To begin to appreciate the connection between Theorem 1 and voting theory, it
is first helpful to realize that if w = 1w + ŵ, where 1w ∈ U0 and ŵ ∈ U1, then
Tw(f) = f˜ ·w = f˜ · 1w + f˜ · ŵ. Furthermore, the ordinal ranking (i.e., who comes
in first, who comes in second, and so on) provided by Tw is going to depend only
on ŵ. After all, f˜ · 1w is contained in U0, and is therefore a constant function.
Building on this insight, we will say that two weighting vectors w,w′ ∈ M (1,n−1)
are equivalent, and write w ∼ w′, if and only if there exist α, α′ ∈ R such that α > 0
and w′ = αw + α′1. It should be clear that in this case, w′ and w will yield the
same ordinal rankings. (Also, note that if α < 0 then the ordinal rankings given by
w′ would be the reverse of the ordinal rankings given byw.) The following theorem,
which follows from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.3.1 in [28], highlights the usefulness
of this equivalence relation on weighting vectors when dealing with positional voting
procedures:
Theorem 2. Let w,w′ ∈ M (1,n−1) be weighting vectors. The ordinal rankings
of Tw(p) and Tw′(p) will be the same for all profiles p ∈ M (1,...,1) if and only if
w ∼ w′.
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In other words, if the weighting vectors w and w′ are not equivalent, then the
ordinal rankings of the outcomes of elections that use w and w′ might differ, even
if the same profile p ∈ M (1,...,1) is used in both elections. In fact, by Theorem 1,
the results of such elections can be arbitrarily different from one another. This
follows from the fact that if w and w′ are not equivalent, then their projections
into U1 will be linearly independent.
Another way of appreciating the effect that Theorem 1 can have on our under-
standing of positional voting procedures is to realize that the effective spaces of Tw
and Tw′ share very little in common unless w ∼ w′. This is because if w ∈ U1
is nonzero, then E(Tw) ∼= S(n−1,1), and thus E(Tw) is an irreducible submodule
of M (1,...,1). This allows us to easily prove theorems like the following, which is
Theorem 4 in [6]:
Theorem 3. Let w,w′ ∈ U1 ⊂ M (1,n−1) be nonzero weighting vectors. Then
E(Tw) = E(Tw′) if and only if w ∼ w′. Furthermore, if E(Tw) 6= E(Tw′), then
E(Tw) ∩E(Tw′) = {0}.
In other words, if w and w′ are not equivalent, then Tw and Tw′ will use very
different subspaces of M (1,...,1) from which to pull the information necessary to
determine the outcome of an election. The projections of a profile p ∈ M (1,...,1)
into those subspaces determine the cardinal rankings of the candidates. We should
therefore not expect any relationship between the associated ordinal rankings of
the candidates.
There are, of course, other voting methods besides positional voting procedures. For
example, a simple ranking scoring function, or SRSF, takes a profile M (1,...,1) and
uses it to assign points to full rankings instead of individual candidates (see [4],
and the related paper [44] where these are posited as a subset of a much larger
class of generalized scoring functions). A winning ranking (as opposed to simply
a winner, which is usually how one interprets normal positional rules) is a ranking
that receives at least as many points as all of the other rankings.
As an example of an SRSF, let x0 ∈ M (1,...,1) be the tabloid (i.e., full ranking)
that has candidate i in row i. Let z ∈ M (1,...,1) be a fixed function, and define
Tz :M
(1,...,1) →M (1,...,1) by setting
Tz(f) =
∑
σ∈Sn
f(σ · x0)(σ · z) = f˜ · z
for all f ∈ M (1,...,1). Thus, if p ∈ M (1,...,1) is a profile, then a winning ranking
in our election would correspond to a tabloid x ∈M (1,...,1) with the property that
Tz(p)(x) ≥ Tz(p)(y) for all y ∈M (1,...,1).
How might we find a sensible function z ∈ M (1,...,1) to create an SRSF like the
one above? One way is to use a metric defined on the tabloids in X(1,...,1). For
example, if d : X(1,...,1) ×X(1,...,1) is a metric with maximum distance dmax, then
we can set z(x) = dmax−d(x, x0). A winning ranking with respect to Tz would then
correspond to a tabloid that is “closest” to the entire multiset of tabloids chosen
by the voters (see [44] for a thorough discussion of “proximity rules”).
10 KARL-DIETER CRISMAN AND MICHAEL E. ORRISON
One of the most popular metrics on X(1,...,1) is the Kendall tau distance, which
measures the number of pairwise disagreements between two rankings. To explain,
let i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} where i 6= j. Let aij ∈ M (1,...,1) be the function defined by
setting aij(x) = 1 whenever candidate i is ranked above j in x (i.e., in the tabloid
x, i is in a higher row than j), and setting aij(x) = 0 otherwise. Kendall’s tau
distance is then given by
d(x, y) =
(
n
2
)
−
∑
i6=j
aij(x)aij(y).
The maximum distance between rankings in this case is
(
n
2
)
, and therefore we
could define the function z ∈ M (1,...,1) by setting z(x) =
∑
i6=j aij(x)aij(x0). The
resulting voting procedure given by Tz then becomes the well-known and well-
studied Kemeny rule [17]. To distinguish this case, we will denote this particular
instance of Tz by K :M
(1,...,1) →M (1,...,1).
Perhaps not surprisingly, we can use the aij to apply K to a profile p ∈ M (1,...,1).
More specifically, with a little bit of effort, and using the fact that the Kendall tau
distance is invariant under the action of Sn, one can show that
K(p) =
∑
i6=j
〈p, aij〉aij
(see Proposition 1 in [40] for a similar expression). On the other hand, it might
not be clear how a voting procedure like the Kemeny rule is related to positional
voting procedures. We describe such a relationship next.
First, it turns out that we can turn any positional voting procedure into an SRSF
as follows. Let w ∈ M (1,n−1) be a weighting vector, and let b ∈ M (1,n−1) be the
weighting vector for the Borda Count:
b = (n− 1)c1 + (n− 2)c2 + · · ·+ (1)cn−1 + (0)cn.
Note that although we will use b in the construction below, any weighting vector
whose weights are strictly decreasing would also work. Next, recall that
Tw(f) = 〈f ,w
(1)〉c1 + · · ·+ 〈f ,w
(n)〉cn.
If we compose Tw with the adjoint T
∗
b
: M (1,n−1) → M (1,...,1), then we create the
map T ∗
b
◦ Tw :M (1,...,1) →M (1,...,1) where
(T ∗b ◦ Tw)(f) = 〈f ,w
(1)〉b(1) + · · ·+ 〈f ,w(n)〉b(n).
It turns out that if we view T ∗
b
◦ Tw as an SRSF, then it will return the ranking
that agrees with the ranking given by Tw (see Proposition 1 in [4]).
For such procedures, individual candidates may then be ranked based on the order
they appear in a winning ranking, recovering the winning candidate(s) in the usual
interpretation of Tw. However, for more general SRSFs (including the Kemeny
rule), this may not always be meaningful. For example, suppose there are three
candidates A, B, and C, and we are given a profile where two voters prefer ABC,
two voters prefer CAB, and only one voter prefers BCA. The Kemeny rule then
produces a tie between the rankings ABC and CAB.
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Next, let cij ∈ M (1,1,n−2) be the indicator function corresponding to the tabloid
that has i in the top row and j in the second row. We will call the map P :
M (1,...,1) →M (1,1,n−2) given by
P (f) =
∑
i6=j
〈f , aij〉cij
the pairs map defined onM (1,...,1). Note that if p ∈M (1,...,1) is a profile, then P (p)
simply catalogues the number of times each candidate was ranked over another
candidate.
For example, when n = 3, M (1,...,1) = M (1,1,n−2), and with respect to the usual
basis of M (1,1,1), the pairs map P can be encoded as the matrix
[P ] =


1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1


.
Note, for example, that the first row of this matrix corresponds to a12, the third
row corresponds to a21, and the sum of these two rows corresponds to the constant
all-ones function in M (1,1,1).
The pairs map P is not surjective. In particular, the codomain has the decompo-
sition
M (1,1,n−2) ∼= S(n) ⊕ 2S(n−1) ⊕ S(n−2,2) ⊕ S(n−2,1,1)
but the effective space of P is isomorphic to S(n)⊕S(n−1,1)⊕S(n−2,1,1) (see p. 682
in [6]). LetW0,W1, andW2 denote the corresponding subspaces inM
(1,...,1), where
W0 ∼= S(n), W1 ∼= S(n−1,1), W2 ∼= S(n−2,1,1), and
E(P ) =W0 ⊕W1 ⊕W2.
Note that if P ∗ :M (1,1,n−2) →M (1,...,1) is the adjoint of P , then
(P ∗ ◦ P )(f) =
∑
i6=j
〈f , aij〉aij .
In other words, K = P ∗ ◦P . This should be compared with T ∗
b
◦Tw defined above,
particularly in the case when w = b corresponds to the Borda count.
If necessary, we can create the matrix encoding of K with respect to the usual basis
ofM (1,...,1) by simply taking the product of the matrix encodings of P ∗ and P . For
example, when n = 3, the matrix encoding of K is
[K] =


3 2 2 1 1 0
2 3 1 0 2 1
2 1 3 2 0 1
1 0 2 3 1 2
1 2 0 1 3 2
0 1 1 2 2 3


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which is the product [P ]t[P ]. Notice the columns of [K] are all permutations of the
first column of [K], which corresponds to the function z ∈ M (1,1,1) that is based
(as was described above) on the Kendall tau distance.
Interestingly, it turns out that the effective space E(Tb) of the Borda Count isW0⊕
W1 (see, for example, Section 7 of [6]). This is perhaps much more understandable
once we realize that
b(i) =
∑
j: i6=j
aij .
Furthermore, by Theorem 3, the only nontrivial positional voting procedures that
containW1 in their effective spaces are those whose weighting vectors are equivalent
to b. This begins to explain theorems like the following, which is a combination of
parts of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 in [35]:
Theorem 4. For n ≥ 3 candidates, the Borda count always ranks the Kemeny
rule top-ranked candidate strictly above the Kemeny rule bottom ranked-candidate.
Conversely, the Kemeny rule ranks the Borda count top-ranked candidate strictly
above the Borda count bottom-ranked candidate. For any positional voting method
other than the Borda count, however, there is no relationship between the Kemeny
rule ranking and the positional ranking.
Using the pairs map P , we can say more about the relationship between the Borda
count and the Kemeny rule. More specifically, because K = P ∗ ◦ P is self-adjoint,
we know it is orthogonally diagonalizable. In fact, the eigenspaces of K are W0,
W1, W2, and (W0 ⊕W1⊕W2)⊥ with eigenvalues κ0 =
n!
2
(
n
2
)
, κ1 =
(n+1)!
6 , κ2 =
n!
6 ,
and 0, respectively (see Theorem 3 in [40]).
If we let Ti : M
(1,...,1) → Wi denote the orthogonal projection onto Wi, we then
have that
K = κ0T0 + κ1T1 + κ2T2.
Furthermore, if β0 =
(n−1)n!
2
(
n
2
)
, β1 =
n(n+1)!
12 , and β2 = 0 then it is possible to
show that
T ∗b ◦ Tb = β0T0 + β1T1 + β2T2.
The Borda count and Kemeny rule may therefore be viewed as members of the
same family of SRSFs whose maps all have the form
K(γ0,γ1,γ2) = γ0T0 + γ1T1 + γ2T2
where γ0, γ1, γ2 ∈ R.
When using K(γ0,γ1,γ2), the resulting ordering of the rankings in X
(1,...,1) depends
only on the ratio γ2/γ1. After all, γ0T0 only contributes scalar multiples of the
all-ones function to the outcome. This fact is exploited in [5] by setting γ0 = 0 and
focusing on a one-parameter family of procedures that is interpreted as being “be-
tween” the Borda count and Kemeny rule. Such a family allows us, for example, to
better understand when properties like being susceptible to the “no-show paradox”
can arise in voting (see Proposition 5.16 in [5]).
By describing everything up to this point in terms of M (1,...,1) and M (1,n−1), we
hope it is clear how one might extend all of these ideas to more general settings.
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For example, suppose λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) is a partition of n. We could ask the voters
to rank the candidates by choosing a tabloid in Xλ, where the candidates in the
top row of their tabloid are their top favorite λ1 candidates, the candidates in the
second row are their next favorite λ2 candidates, and so on.
When voters are asked to provide rankings by choosing a tabloid from X(1,...,1), we
say they are giving full rankings of the candidates. If they are choosing tabloids
from Xλ where λ 6= (1, . . . , 1), then we say they are giving partial rankings (of
shape λ) of the candidates. We can therefore ask if any of the theorems above
can be extended to partial rankings. For some of the theorems, the answer is yes.
In fact, the paper by Daugherty et al. [6] focused primarily on such theorems for
positional voting.
Notice also that the maps Tw and Tz were defined in essentially the same way.
In both cases, we chose a vector v ∈ Mµ for some partition µ, and then defined
Tv : M
(1,...,1) → Mµ by setting Tv(f) = f˜ · v. We then used Tv and a profile
p ∈M (1,...,1) to find the “best” tabloid inMµ based on “points” that Tv(p) assigned
to the standard basis vectors ofMµ. What would happen if we were to extend this
construction to situations in which voters choose tabloids in Xλ and points are then
assigned to tabloids inXµ? Would we learn anything new? For readers interested in
exploring this question, Section 3 in [6] might be a good place to start. It discusses
maps fromMλ toM (1,n−1) and what happens to positional voting procedures when
voters are asked to provide partial (instead of full) rankings of shape λ.
Another possible direction one might take is to ask what would happen if we were
to replace the pairs map in the definition of the Kemeny rule with maps that
catalogue information about triples of candidates, or quadruples of candidates, and
so on. Doing so would then place the Kemeny rule in another potentially interesting
family of voting procedures. We are not aware of any work in this direction, but
anyone interested in pursuing such a project would almost certainly benefit from
the discussions about inversions in [9] and [25].
Finally, there are maximum likelihood estimator procedures which give the “most
likely” ranking of the candidates, assuming that the voters all meant to choose the
same ranking but their votes were corrupted by a noise model. Young [43] shows
that the Borda count is an MLE when the desired outcome is a single winner, and
that the Kemeny rule is an MLE when the desired outcome is a full ranking. In [26],
the question of which procedure is an MLE when the desired outcome is a top pair,
top triple, and so forth is investigated. Given the connection between SRSFs and
MLEs found in [4], we suspect that an algebraic approach to MLE procedures has
tremendous promise.
4. Game Theory
For algebraists interested in learning about (transferable utility cooperative) game
theory, the pioneering work of Kleinberg and Weiss [18–22] will quickly make them
feel welcome. Consider, for example, the first few lines from the introduction of [18]:
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Game theory and algebra become inextricably intertwined once one
recognizes that the notion of a permutation of players gives rise to
a representation of the symmetric group in the space of automor-
phisms of G, the vector space of games (in characteristic function
form).
In this paper we use this observation to attempt to turn the usual
approach to game-theoretic problems on its head by analyzing the
space of games as an algebraist might. In this way, we can see if
the mathematical structure of G has anything to say about what
constructs are significant from a game-theoretic point of view.
In this section, we focus on the role that tabloids play when navigating Kleinberg
and Weiss’s work, as well as the recent work of Herna´ndez-Lamoneda, Jua´rez, and
Sa´nchez-Sa´nchez [10] and Sa´nchez-Pe´rez [37]. We then take advantage of our use
of tabloids to suggest possible extensions of their work.
We begin with some notation and terminology. Let n ≥ 2, and suppose we have
n players. We will label the players with the numbers 1, . . . , n, and we will let
N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of all of the players.
A cooperative game for N is a real-valued function defined on the set of all subsets
of N , with the convention that the empty set is always mapped to 0. The set of all
such games
G = {v : 2N → R | v(∅) = 0}
models ways in which various subsets (“coalitions”) can be allotted a utility (“value”)
based on the extent to which they are perceived to contribute to the entire set of
players (“the grand coalition”).
One of the defining challenges in cooperative game theory is to find useful and
meaningful solution concepts, which are functions defined on G that are used to
determine a “payoff” for each individual player. More specifically, if we index the
individual players by tabloids in X(1,n−1) as we did in the last section on voting
theory, then we can think of a solution concept as a function
ϕ : G →M (1,n−1)
where if v ∈ G and i ∈ N , then the value that ϕ associates to player i is the
coefficient in front of ci in ϕ(v). If we denote this value by ϕ(v)i, then
ϕ(v) = ϕ(v)1c1 + · · ·+ ϕ(v)ncn.
It is interesting to note that, algebraically, a solution concept looks similar to a
positional voting procedure, in that the payoff that a solution concept assigns to
a player is similar to the points that a positional voting procedure assigns to a
candidate.
The vector space G of games is of course much more than just a vector space. It is
an RSn-module, where for all σ ∈ Sn and v ∈ G,
(σ · v)(S) = v(σ−1 · S)
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for all subsets S ∈ 2N , and where σ−1 · S is the set you obtain by applying σ−1 to
each element of S. Furthermore, the irreducible submodules of G are straightfor-
ward to describe.
First, note that we can write G = G1⊕G2 · · ·⊕Gn−1⊕Gn, where Gk is the subspace
of all games that assign the value 0 to any subset of players that does not have size
k. Next, if we index the k-element subsets of players using tabloids in X(k,n−k),
then it becomes clear that
Gk ∼=M
(k,n−k).
When k ≤ n/2, we know that M (k,n−k) ∼= S(n)⊕S(n−1,1)⊕ · · · ⊕S(n−k,k). We also
know that M (k,n−k) ∼= M (n−k,k). Thus, if we let Ukj denote the submodule of Gk
that is isomorphic to the Specht module S(n−j,j), we then have
G1 = U
1
0 ⊕ U
1
1
G2 = U
2
0 ⊕ U
2
1 ⊕ U
2
2
G3 = U
3
0 ⊕ U
3
1 ⊕ U
3
2 ⊕ U
3
3
...
G⌊n/2⌋ = U
⌊n/2⌋
0 ⊕ U
⌊n/2⌋
1 ⊕ U
⌊n/2⌋
2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ U
⌊n/2⌋
⌊n/2⌋
...
Gn−2 = U
n−2
0 ⊕ U
n−2
1 ⊕ U
n−2
2
Gn−1 = U
n−1
0 ⊕ U
n−1
1
Gn = U
n
0 .
We may therefore write G as a direct sum of the irreducible Ukj , where
G =

⌊n/2⌋⊕
k=1
k⊕
j=0
Ukj

⊕

 n⊕
k>⌊n/2⌋
n−k⊕
j=0
Ukj


which is essentially equation (3) in [18].
The above decomposition is helpful in cooperative game theory because the con-
sensus since [39] is that linear and symmetric solution concepts are particularly
important, and these solution concepts coincide with the set of all RSn-module
homomorphisms from G to M (1,n−1). Moreover, because the Gk have such sim-
ple decompositions into irreducible submodules, these homomorphisms are easy to
describe.
To explain, first recall thatM (1,n−1) is the direct sum of U0 and U1, where U0 ∼= S(n)
and U1 ∼= S(n−1,1). By Schur’s lemma, this means that any module homomorphism
from Gk ∼= M (k,n−k) to M (1,n−1) must contain Ukj in its kernel for all j ≥ 2. We
may therefore describe any homomorphism from G to M (1,n−1) by focusing only on
homomorphisms defined on the Uk0 and U
k
1 as follows.
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Let T k0 : U
k
0 → U0 and T
k
1 : U
k
1 → U1 be any fixed isomorphisms. By a slight
abuse of notation, we can view these isomorphisms as homomorphisms from G to
M (1,n−1) by identifying them with ι0 ◦ T k0 ◦ p
k
0 and ι1 ◦ T
k
1 ◦ p
k
1 , respectively, where
pk0 is the projection map onto U
k
0 , p
k
1 is the projection map onto U
k
1 , and ι0 and ι1
are the usual inclusion maps into M (1,n−1).
By Schur’s lemma, every module homomorphism from G to M (1,n−1) may be ex-
pressed uniquely as a linear combination of the T k0 and T
k
1 . In other words, for every
linear symmetric solution concept ϕ : G → M (1,n−1), there exist scalars c10, . . . , c
n
0
and c11, . . . , c
n−1
1 such that
ϕ = (c10T
1
0 + · · ·+ c
n
0T
n
0 ) + (c
1
1T
1
1 + · · ·+ c
n−1
1 T
n−1
1 ).
Working with and describing linear symmetric solution concepts therefore becomes
a matter of manipulating and communicating the cj0 and c
j
1. Moreover, there are
choices for the T k0 and T
k
1 that make certain properties of solution concepts easy
to verify.
For example, consider the following maps that appear in [21, 22]. First, let
A(v, k) =
(
n
k
)−1 ∑
S: |S|=k
v(S)
denote the average value received by the coalitions of size k, and let
γ(k) =
(
n− 2
k − 1
)
.
Then define T k0 by setting T
k
0 (v)i = k
−1A(v, k), and define T k1 by setting
T k1 (v)i = γ(k)
−1
∑
S: |S|=k and i∈S
[v(S)−A(v, k)] .
(A somewhat different approach is taken in [10], but the results are essentially
scaled versions of the maps above.)
As example of a property that can now be expressed in terms of the cj0 and c
j
1,
consider the property of efficiency, where a solution concept ϕ is said to be efficient
if
ϕ(v)1 + · · ·+ ϕ(v)n = v(N)
for all v ∈ G. It turns out that a linear symmetric solution concept will be efficient
if and only if c10 = · · · = c
n−1
0 = 0 and c
n
0 = 1 (see Proposition 2 in [21]).
As another example, a solution concept ϕ is said to be a marginal value if there
exist scalars m1, . . . ,mn such that
ϕ(v)i =
∑
S: i∈S
m|S|(v(S)− v(S − i))
for all v ∈ G. In this case, it turns out we can recover ϕ by setting
ck0 = k
[
mk
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
−mk+1
(
n− 1
k
)]
and
ck1 = γ(k) [mk +mk+1]
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where we define mn+1 = 0 (see Proposition 1 in [22]).
The above approach to describing linear symmetric solution concepts becomes even
more powerful when we ask about solution concepts that have more than one such
property. For example, using the insights above, we may easily verify that there
must be precisely one linear symmetric solution concept that is also an efficient
marginal value. It is the well-studied Shapley value [39], which is obtained by
setting c10 = · · · = c
n−1
0 = 0, c
n
0 = 1, and c
1
1 = · · · = c
n−1
1 =
1
n−1 (see Section 3
of [22]; see also Section 4.3 of [10]).
Similarly, [10] uses this type of analysis to prove a simple and intuitive criterion for
a solution concept to be a “self-dual” marginal value. To explain, they define the
duality operator ∗ : G → G by setting (∗v)(S) = v(N) − v(N − S) for all v ∈ G.
A linear symmetric solution ϕ is then said to be self-dual if ϕ(∗v) = ϕ(v) for all
v ∈ G. It turns out that a linear symmetric marginal value will be self-dual if and
only if the mk defined above have the property that mj = mn−j−1 for all j < n
(see Proposition 6 of [10]).
By viewing a linear symmetric solution concept as a module homomorphism ϕ :
G →M (1,n−1), it is now easy to see how one might replaceM (1,n−1) byM (k,n−k) to
get linear symmetric solution concepts that assign payoffs to k-element subsets of
players instead of individual players. Such an idea was explored in [18], but there is
room for significant additional investigation, as the conjectures in that paper seem
to imply. From a representation-theoretic point of view, we could easily begin by
including in the discussion above module homomorphisms defined on the Ukj when
j ≥ 2.
In some sense, this would begin to address the question posed in some of the papers
referenced above as to whether the common kernel of all linear symmetric solution
concepts has useful structure. After all, this common kernel is the sum of all of
the Ukj where j ≥ 2, and each of these submodules would begin to contribute
to generalized solution concepts that involved payoffs for pairs, triples, and so on.
Finding meaningful properties of the associated generalized solution concepts could
be challenging, but doing so might ultimately prove to be illuminating, especially
if they were to enhance our understanding of cherished properties (e.g., being a
marginal value) that solution concepts might possess.
The approach taken in [10] is extended in [37] to so-called games in partition func-
tion form. In this setting, the value of a coalition S depends not just on the
coalition, but on how the players not in the coalition are themselves partitioned
into coalitions. In this way, an “embedded coalition” is a pair (S,Q) such that Q
is a (set) partition of N and S ∈ Q. The dimension of the resulting game space is
much larger, and its decomposition into irreducible submodules has only been done
for n = 3 and n = 4, which are (unsurprisingly) mostly U0 and U1 for those n. Can
a decomposition of the general case be described? If so, can it be used to describe
properties (e.g., efficiency) of the associated generalized solution concepts? (See,
for example, Corollary 4 in [37].)
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Finally, it is also possible to decompose non-cooperative games [15, 16]. In the
simplest version of this setting, players have strategies they individually decide
upon, yielding varying payoffs. As is shown in [16], we can decompose such games
into “fully competitive” zero-sum components and “cooperative” components in
which all of the players receive the same payoff. The main theorem in [15] takes this
further, while also giving a different interpretation to the zero-sum situation. As an
example of their results, they show that the space of 2×2 games may be decomposed
into a four-dimensional subspace that uniquely determines the Nash outcome, a
two-dimensional subspace consisting solely of payoffs for each player which does
not affect any strategic analysis, and a two-dimensional subspace governing other
behavioral features. It would be interesting to better understand the role that
representation might play here. Some first steps in this direction are being taken
by Jessie [14].
5. Conclusion
As we have seen, the permutation representations arising from the action of the
symmetric group on tabloids provide a unifying framework for understanding and
extending foundational ideas in both voting theory and game theory. There is,
however, much more work that could be done, and we encourage interested read-
ers to consider how they might use these and other ideas to contribute to our
understanding of voting theory, game theory, and other mathematical behavioral
sciences.
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